The Household Ledger — what the market promised, what it took
India's economy grew 7.8% last quarter. Savings are flowing into the market at a record pace. And in the same year, 88 lakh ordinary people traded derivatives and, taken together, lost ₹72,243 crore to the other side of the market and another ₹25,000 crore or so in costs — almost all of it in options, almost all of it to about twenty firms trading by algorithm. This page lays the public record side by side, figure by figure, with where each one came from. It does not tell you what to do with your money.
What this page will not do
It will not recommend an investment, an allocation, an exit, a "hedge", or a side of any trade. It will not score anyone. Leap of Faith Labs is not a registered investment adviser and does not want to be one. This is a ledger: the public record, read from the primary documents, with every figure graded by how directly we verified it. If a number here changes your mind, the source is beside it so you can check us.
1 · The ledger, before costs
Derivatives are zero-sum before costs: every rupee one side loses, another side gains. SEBI's study says so in its own words — "the aggregate losses of individual traders were broadly matched by the aggregate profits of corporate and institutional participants." This table is exchange data for the whole population, squared-off profit and loss, FY25 and FY26.
| Category | FY25 | FY26 | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Individuals (106 lakh → 88 lakh people) | −₹97,882 cr | −₹72,243 cr | L0 |
| Proprietary desks (exchange members trading their own book; includes foreign-owned firms registered locally) | +₹45,955 cr | +₹44,483 cr | L0 |
| Foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) | +₹31,085 cr | +₹13,896 cr | L0 |
| Corporates and trusts | +₹8,092 cr | +₹5,960 cr | L0 |
| Mutual funds | +₹5,613 cr | +₹2,595 cr | L0 |
| Partnerships and LLPs | +₹4,737 cr | +₹2,953 cr | L0 |
FY26 gross, scaled to the individual loss. Source: SEBI study, 20 Aug 2026. L0
2 · Then the costs, paid by individuals
On top of the ₹72,243 crore that went to the other side, individuals paid ₹24,859 crore in costs in FY26: brokerage about 44% (~₹11,000 crore), securities transaction tax 27% (₹6,645 crore), exchange fees 16%, GST 11%, stamp duty and SEBI fee about 2%. The study's own footnote says its cost figure covers about 80% of turnover, so the true cost is nearer 1.25 times — roughly ₹31,000 crore. Net of costs, in the fifteen-broker sample that covers about 90% of individuals, the loss is the ₹91,685 crore the headlines carried. Over two years, FY25 and FY26 together, individuals lost ₹2.03 lakh crore after costs — more than the ₹1.81 lakh crore of the three years before.
For those who lost, costs were 35% of their gross loss (44% in FY25). 4.4 lakh people were profitable before costs and net losers after them.
| Figure | Value | Source | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Costs paid by individuals, FY26 (study figure) | ₹24,859 cr | SEBI study, 20 Aug 2026 | L0 |
| Costs, adjusted for the study's ~80% coverage | ≈ ₹31,000 cr | our arithmetic on the study's footnote | L1 |
| Net loss after costs, FY26 (15-broker sample, ~90%) | ₹91,685 cr | SEBI study | L0 |
| Net loss, FY25 | ₹1.12 lakh cr | SEBI study | L0 |
| Net loss, FY25 + FY26 | ₹2.03 lakh cr | SEBI study | L0 |
| Net loss, FY22–FY24 (three years, earlier study) | ₹1.81 lakh cr | SEBI study | L0 |
| Costs as share of loss-makers' gross loss | 35% (44% in FY25) | SEBI study | L0 |
| Profitable before costs, losers after | 4.4 lakh people | SEBI study | L0 |
3 · How concentrated the winning side is
The common frame is "foreign investors against Indians". The study's data does not support that cut. Proprietary desks — exchange members trading their own money — are about 60% of all turnover; FPIs about 7%. And the proprietary category includes foreign-owned firms that trade as Indian members (Jane Street's Indian entity is one). The honest cut is local proprietary desks versus foreign portfolio accounts, and most of the money goes to the former. Inside the proprietary category the money is concentrated to a degree the headlines miss:
| Figure | Value | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| Top 10 proprietary desks, share of proprietary index-option turnover | 85% (top 20: 90%) | L0 |
| Top 10 proprietary desks (2.3% of the category), profit | ₹33,124 cr — 74.5% of all proprietary profit | L0 |
| Top 5 proprietary desks, profit | ₹21,157 cr | L0 |
| Top 10 FPIs, profit | ₹6,852 cr — 49% of FPI profit | L0 |
| Share of FPI and proprietary profit from entities that placed at least one algorithmic order | 99% | L0 |
| Entities trading algorithmically | 86% of FPIs · 47% of proprietary desks | L0 |
| Individuals flagged "algorithmic" (mostly brokers' 3:20 pm auto-square-off, not the client's own algorithm) | ~15% | L0 |
| Share of profit from options | proprietary 98% · FPIs 77%; individuals lost >90% in options | L0 |
| FPI open interest vs turnover | a quarter to a third of open interest on 7% of turnover — position-holders, not the high-frequency side | L0 |
So roughly ₹40,000 crore of FY26's ₹58,000 crore institutional gain went to about twenty entities. The study states the dependency itself: "options liquidity is closely tied to the continued participation of these few large firms."
4 · Why options lose whichever way the market goes
The study separates futures from options by quarter. In futures, individuals are mostly long and their results track the market: +₹3,741 crore in Q1 FY25 when the Nifty rose 7%, −₹8,081 crore in Q4 FY26 when it fell 15%. In options, individuals lost every single quarter — including Q1 FY26, when the Nifty rose 9% and they lost ₹18,878 crore. Direction is irrelevant, because what is being traded is mostly time:
| Figure | Value | Source | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Index-option turnover on the expiry day itself | 59% (70% before Nov 2024) | SEBI study | L0 |
| … within one day of expiry · within a week · more than ten days out | 75% · 97% · 1% | SEBI study | L0 |
| Individuals who are option buyers (companion behaviour study, ~5,000-trader sample) | ~97%; only the ~2% who sell had positive median returns | as reported | L1 |
| Individuals' futures result, Q1 FY25 (Nifty +7%) · Q4 FY26 (Nifty −15%) | +₹3,741 cr · −₹8,081 cr | SEBI study | L0 |
| Individuals' options result, Q1 FY26 (Nifty +9%) | −₹18,878 cr | SEBI study | L0 |
A same-day, out-of-the-money option is a ticket whose value decays to zero by the close; the seller on the other side is usually a hedged market maker keeping the decay and the spread. That is a description of the product, not a suggestion about which side to be on.
5 · Who the 88 lakh are
| Figure | Value | Source | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Under 30 | 43% (31% in FY22); 89% of them lose | SEBI study | L0 |
| Declared income under ₹5 lakh (self-declared; data for ~55% of sample) | ~73–75%; 43% of turnover, 53% of losses | SEBI study | L0 |
| From beyond the top-30 cities | two-thirds of traders, half of turnover — while those cities hold a quarter of mutual-fund assets | SEBI study | L0 |
| Hold no shares at all | 35% (42.8 lakh people) | SEBI study | L0 |
| Hold under ₹1 lakh in shares | 78%; produced 70% of losses | SEBI study | L0 |
| Under ₹1 lakh portfolio but over ₹1 crore turnover | 13% of traders; 52% of all losses | SEBI study | L0 |
| Turnover as a multiple of portfolio value | 42.5× overall | SEBI study | L0 |
| Loss rate, regular traders vs new traders | 87.7% vs 87.8% — regulars lose 2.3× more per head (₹1.36 lakh vs ₹59k) at 46× leverage | SEBI study | L0 |
| Two-year losers who lost again in year three | 90% | SEBI study | L0 |
| Women | 17% of traders; loss rate 84.7% vs 88.6%; same intensity | SEBI study | L0 |
6 · Who bears the damage
The average loss of ₹1.17 lakh hides the shape. 77% of traders lose up to ₹1 lakh and account for about 10% of losses. 2.7% of traders — 1.88 lakh people — lost over ₹10 lakh each and account for 49% of losses. 4,783 individuals lost over ₹1 crore in FY26. Over two years, 13,663 people lost more than ₹1 crore (average ₹2.2 crore) against 1,842 who made more than ₹1 crore — seven to one; in the ₹1–10 lakh band it is twenty-one to one. Even the twenty highest-turnover individuals in the country were net losers. And the winners are shrinking: average profit per profit-maker halved between the two study periods, from ₹3.09 lakh to ₹1.46 lakh. L0
7 · By state — the map exists
The study's annexure gives the picture state by state (Table 45). The loss rate is above 85% everywhere. Where it is highest — Assam, Bihar, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh — is also where trading turnover is the largest multiple of what people actually own.
| State | Turnover ÷ portfolio value | Loss rate | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Andhra Pradesh | 101× | >85% | L0 |
| Odisha | 100× | >85% | L0 |
| North-East (combined) | 93× | >85%; Assam 90.5%, the highest | L0 |
| Bihar | 92× | among the five highest | L0 |
| Jammu & Kashmir | 83× | among the five highest | L0 |
| Maharashtra | — | 15 lakh traders; ₹17,036 cr lost | L0 |
| All India | 42.5× | 87.7% | L0 |
Full state table to follow once Table 45 is transcribed row by row — it becomes the second column of the Commons Atlas beside the CSR map.
The same shape as the CSR map
Our first series showed where India's corporate social spending goes: ₹61 a year reaches each poor person in Bihar, ₹64,308 in Goa. The money follows factories, not need. This series shows the mirror image: where household money leaves, and the states where it leaves fastest relative to what people own are the same states the CSR money never reaches. Two flows, one pattern: attention and capital priced against where need is.
Where the money doesn't arrive
CSR to Bihar: 0.95% of attributable spend for 20.5% of India's poor. Seven states hold 61% of the poor and receive 10.7% of the money. The Misallocation Index →
Where the money leaves
Bihar: trading turnover 92 times what traders own; loss rate among the five highest in the country. Nationally, ₹72,243 crore gross from 88 lakh accounts in one year, 98% of the winning side's profit from options. Sources ↓
8 · The ecosystem that runs on the flow
| Who | Figure | Source | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| The stock exchange (NSE) | FY26 revenue ₹16,601 cr, profit ₹10,302 cr; equity options ₹9,997.5 cr = 60.2% of revenue; transaction charges 78.6%. Its public offering opened 17 Sept 2026: ₹22,561 cr raise at ~₹4.42 lakh cr valuation. | NSE filings via Upstox | L1 |
| The largest retail broker (Zerodha) | FY26 profit ₹4,283 cr on ~₹8,500 cr revenue; brokerage falling, margin-funding income rising | Entrackr | L2 |
| The state (securities transaction tax) | ₹53,296 cr (FY25) → ₹57,522 cr (FY26) → ₹73,700 cr budgeted FY27, after a second rate rise from 1 April 2026 (options premium 0.1 → 0.15%; futures 0.02 → 0.05%); ₹40,214 cr collected by 17 Sept, +53%. Individuals' STT in derivatives up five-fold since FY22. | Business Standard; Budget documents | L1 |
| Everyday expiry | An exchange product decision (NSE–BSE competition, 2019–24), not something traders invented | SEBI study; exchange circulars | L1 |
The fiscal line grows while the regulator tries to shrink the base. We record that as a tension in the public record, not as a verdict on anyone's intent.
9 · When the rules were enforced
Two cases mark where the regulator drew the line — one a large foreign-owned firm trading through local entities, one a domestic social-media network. Both matter here: the first shows the other side of the ledger in the open; the second is what "organising retail" against institutions runs into.
| Case | What the record says | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| SEBI v. Jane Street (interim order, 3 July 2025) | Net India profit ₹36,502 cr, Jan 2023 – Mar 2025: about ₹43,300 cr won in index options against ~₹7,700 cr deliberately lost in stock futures, index futures and cash. Eighteen expiry days examined. On 17 Jan 2024: buy ~₹4,400–5,300 cr of Bank Nifty stocks and futures in the morning while holding ~₹32,000 cr of bearish options exposure (6:1), sell in the afternoon; ~₹735 cr profit that day. ₹4,843.57 cr impounded; ban lifted on deposit; Securities Appellate Tribunal appeal pending (adjourned 25 Feb 2026). | L0 |
| Where the profit was booked | Profits reported in the Singapore/Asia entities; cash-market losses in the Indian company (FPIs cannot trade intraday cash). Tax treatment as reported, not adjudicated. | L2 |
| JSI Investments (Jane Street's Indian entity), own filing | Net trading gains ₹4,700 cr in FY25, up from ₹790 cr — +494% | L1 |
| SEBI finfluencer order, 23 May 2026 | Telegram / WhatsApp / X network (~54,000 followers) pushing 82 mostly small-cap stocks; ₹20.25 cr wrongful gains; restrained under fraud and unfair-trade-practice rules | L1 |
| Millennium Management | Reported to be under SEBI examination next | L2 |
The line between "liquidity provision" and "manipulation" in the first case is one of degree: options exposure six times the cash being moved.
10 · What the November 2024 measures did
SEBI's own reading: the measures "moderated participation but did not fundamentally alter trading behaviour." The numbers behind that sentence:
| Figure | Value | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| Individual traders | −18% (106 → 87.5 lakh); new entrants −40%; 46 lakh people exited | L0 |
| Smallest traders (<₹10k turnover) vs largest (>₹1 cr) | −37% vs +1–3% | L0 |
| Premium turnover | −17%, then +38% in H2 FY26 to ₹82,000 cr a day — above pre-measure levels | L0 |
| Expiry-day share of index-option turnover | 70% → 59% | L0 |
| Loss per head | up 2% | L0 |
| Global exchange-traded derivatives volume, 2025 | −42%, attributed to India's curbs alone | L1 (FIA) |
| Queued: suitability rules tied to equity holdings (Dec 2025 proposal) · expiry days cut to two a week (Sept 2025) · delta-based position limits · the April 2026 STT rise | — | L1 |
| Precedent: Korea, 2011 — KOSPI 200 option multiplier raised five-fold; retail options volume collapsed. India chose lot-size and expiry limits and saw a rebound. | — | L1 |
11 · The household balance sheet, and where the savings go
Two numbers are often quoted about households, and both are usually quoted wrong. Savings did not "collapse to 5%" — that figure is net financial savings in FY23; net financial savings were 7.0% of national disposable income in FY25. Debt is higher than the commonly cited 41%: the Reserve Bank puts it at 45.5% of GDP (Sept 2025), with more than half of household borrowing now for consumption rather than housing. And the same households are, in aggregate, the most disciplined savers the market has ever had: SIP inflows hit a record ₹32,297 crore in August 2026; domestic institutions now own more of listed India than foreign ones. Both columns are true at once.
| Figure | Value | Period | Source | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Household debt, share of GDP | 45.5% (5-yr avg 42.9%) | Sept 2025 | RBI Financial Stability Report, June 2026 | L1 |
| Non-housing retail loans, share of household borrowing | 58.4% | Sept 2025 | RBI FSR, June 2026 | L1 |
| Net household financial savings, share of GNDI | 7.0% (5.8% FY24) | FY25 | RBI Annual Report, May 2026 | L1 |
| The often-quoted "5.1%" | net financial savings, FY23 — stale | FY23 | widely repeated | L3 |
| Monthly SIP inflow | ₹32,297 cr (record) | Aug 2026 | AMFI | L1 |
| Ownership of NSE-listed companies: domestic institutions · FPIs · mutual funds · individuals | 19.5% · 15.1% (17-yr low) · 11.6% · 19.3% (₹90.3 lakh cr) | Q2 FY26 | Business Standard | L2 |
| GDP growth | 7.8% | Q1 FY27 | MoSPI | L1 |
| "₹17–19 lakh crore corporate cash, March 2026" | extrapolation, no source found (verifiable: ₹14.3 lakh cr, Nifty 500, Sept 2024) | — | — | L3 |
12 · How to read the grades
| Grade | Meaning |
|---|---|
| L0 | We read the primary document ourselves (the SEBI study, the SEBI order) and the figure is quoted from it directly. |
| L1 | An official figure reported by a named outlet from the primary document, or our own arithmetic on a primary figure; we have not yet read that primary page ourselves. We upgrade to L0 as we do. |
| L2 | A press or industry compilation with a named source but no single official document behind it, or a matter reported but not adjudicated. |
| L3 | A widely repeated claim we could not source, or found to be stale or wrong. Kept on the ledger so the correction travels with the number. |
All figures verified 23 September 2026. Nothing on this page is scored, ranked or combined into an index. Still to do: transcribe Table 45 in full; read the RBI FSR and Annual Report pages directly and upgrade §11.
Sources
- SEBI, Study: Profitability of Individual Traders in the Equity Derivatives Segment, FY25–FY26, 20 Aug 2026 — PDF (91 pages) · study page
- Demographics as reported — Business Standard, 23 Aug 2026 · CorpLawUpdates summary
- Securities transaction tax — Business Standard, 18 Sept 2026
- NSE revenue and offering — Upstox, Sept 2026
- Zerodha FY26 — Entrackr
- Global derivatives volume 2025 — FIA
- Jane Street — SAT status, Feb 2026 · JSI Investments filing · Capitalmind on the mechanics · Oxford Business Law Blog
- Suitability rules — as reported · Millennium — BusinessWorld
- SEBI finfluencer order, 23 May 2026 — ANI
- RBI Financial Stability Report, June 2026 — household debt, Business Standard · RBI Annual Report, May 2026 — savings, Business Standard
- AMFI, Aug 2026 — SIP ₹32,297 cr · Ownership — Business Standard · GDP — Business Standard
- CSR figures — The CSR Misallocation Index · How we make these reports
Leap of Faith Labs · CC-BY-SA 4.0 · Take this ledger, check it, extend it. If you find a figure wrong, tell us — the correction goes on the page with your name if you want it there.