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The same SEBI study, read as an argument rather than a ledger: The Options Ledger — where ₹91,685 crore went.
Witness ledger · Second series · v2, 23 September 2026 · read from the primary

The Household Ledger — what the market promised, what it took

India's economy grew 7.8% last quarter. Savings are flowing into the market at a record pace. And in the same year, 88 lakh ordinary people traded derivatives and, taken together, lost ₹72,243 crore to the other side of the market and another ₹25,000 crore or so in costs — almost all of it in options, almost all of it to about twenty firms trading by algorithm. This page lays the public record side by side, figure by figure, with where each one came from. It does not tell you what to do with your money.

88 lakhindividuals traded equity derivatives in FY26 (106 lakh in FY25)
−₹72,243 crwhat individuals lost to the other side, before costs
−₹91,685 crafter brokerage, taxes and fees (15-broker sample, ~90% of individuals)
74.5%of all proprietary-desk profit went to ten desks
>85%loss rate in every state; highest in Assam, Bihar, J&K, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh
60.2%of the stock exchange's revenue comes from equity options

What this page will not do

It will not recommend an investment, an allocation, an exit, a "hedge", or a side of any trade. It will not score anyone. Leap of Faith Labs is not a registered investment adviser and does not want to be one. This is a ledger: the public record, read from the primary documents, with every figure graded by how directly we verified it. If a number here changes your mind, the source is beside it so you can check us.

Version 2. The first draft of this page (earlier on 23 Sep) was built from press coverage. This version is read from SEBI's own 91-page study and the filings around it. Three things changed: the loss is now shown both before costs (exchange data, everyone) and after costs (broker sample); the winning side is cut as local proprietary desks versus foreign portfolio accounts, because the proprietary category includes foreign-owned firms trading as Indian members; and the state-wise figures we said were "not published" are in the study's annexure. The earlier version's L1 figures are now L0 or corrected.

1 · The ledger, before costs

Derivatives are zero-sum before costs: every rupee one side loses, another side gains. SEBI's study says so in its own words — "the aggregate losses of individual traders were broadly matched by the aggregate profits of corporate and institutional participants." This table is exchange data for the whole population, squared-off profit and loss, FY25 and FY26.

CategoryFY25FY26Grade
Individuals (106 lakh → 88 lakh people)−₹97,882 cr−₹72,243 crL0
Proprietary desks (exchange members trading their own book; includes foreign-owned firms registered locally)+₹45,955 cr+₹44,483 crL0
Foreign portfolio investors (FPIs)+₹31,085 cr+₹13,896 crL0
Corporates and trusts+₹8,092 cr+₹5,960 crL0
Mutual funds+₹5,613 cr+₹2,595 crL0
Partnerships and LLPs+₹4,737 cr+₹2,953 crL0

FY26 gross, scaled to the individual loss. Source: SEBI study, 20 Aug 2026. L0

2 · Then the costs, paid by individuals

On top of the ₹72,243 crore that went to the other side, individuals paid ₹24,859 crore in costs in FY26: brokerage about 44% (~₹11,000 crore), securities transaction tax 27% (₹6,645 crore), exchange fees 16%, GST 11%, stamp duty and SEBI fee about 2%. The study's own footnote says its cost figure covers about 80% of turnover, so the true cost is nearer 1.25 times — roughly ₹31,000 crore. Net of costs, in the fifteen-broker sample that covers about 90% of individuals, the loss is the ₹91,685 crore the headlines carried. Over two years, FY25 and FY26 together, individuals lost ₹2.03 lakh crore after costs — more than the ₹1.81 lakh crore of the three years before.

For those who lost, costs were 35% of their gross loss (44% in FY25). 4.4 lakh people were profitable before costs and net losers after them.

FigureValueSourceGrade
Costs paid by individuals, FY26 (study figure)₹24,859 crSEBI study, 20 Aug 2026L0
Costs, adjusted for the study's ~80% coverage≈ ₹31,000 crour arithmetic on the study's footnoteL1
Net loss after costs, FY26 (15-broker sample, ~90%)₹91,685 crSEBI studyL0
Net loss, FY25₹1.12 lakh crSEBI studyL0
Net loss, FY25 + FY26₹2.03 lakh crSEBI studyL0
Net loss, FY22–FY24 (three years, earlier study)₹1.81 lakh crSEBI studyL0
Costs as share of loss-makers' gross loss35% (44% in FY25)SEBI studyL0
Profitable before costs, losers after4.4 lakh peopleSEBI studyL0

3 · How concentrated the winning side is

The common frame is "foreign investors against Indians". The study's data does not support that cut. Proprietary desks — exchange members trading their own money — are about 60% of all turnover; FPIs about 7%. And the proprietary category includes foreign-owned firms that trade as Indian members (Jane Street's Indian entity is one). The honest cut is local proprietary desks versus foreign portfolio accounts, and most of the money goes to the former. Inside the proprietary category the money is concentrated to a degree the headlines miss:

FigureValueGrade
Top 10 proprietary desks, share of proprietary index-option turnover85% (top 20: 90%)L0
Top 10 proprietary desks (2.3% of the category), profit₹33,124 cr — 74.5% of all proprietary profitL0
Top 5 proprietary desks, profit₹21,157 crL0
Top 10 FPIs, profit₹6,852 cr — 49% of FPI profitL0
Share of FPI and proprietary profit from entities that placed at least one algorithmic order99%L0
Entities trading algorithmically86% of FPIs · 47% of proprietary desksL0
Individuals flagged "algorithmic" (mostly brokers' 3:20 pm auto-square-off, not the client's own algorithm)~15%L0
Share of profit from optionsproprietary 98% · FPIs 77%; individuals lost >90% in optionsL0
FPI open interest vs turnovera quarter to a third of open interest on 7% of turnover — position-holders, not the high-frequency sideL0

So roughly ₹40,000 crore of FY26's ₹58,000 crore institutional gain went to about twenty entities. The study states the dependency itself: "options liquidity is closely tied to the continued participation of these few large firms."

4 · Why options lose whichever way the market goes

The study separates futures from options by quarter. In futures, individuals are mostly long and their results track the market: +₹3,741 crore in Q1 FY25 when the Nifty rose 7%, −₹8,081 crore in Q4 FY26 when it fell 15%. In options, individuals lost every single quarter — including Q1 FY26, when the Nifty rose 9% and they lost ₹18,878 crore. Direction is irrelevant, because what is being traded is mostly time:

FigureValueSourceGrade
Index-option turnover on the expiry day itself59% (70% before Nov 2024)SEBI studyL0
… within one day of expiry · within a week · more than ten days out75% · 97% · 1%SEBI studyL0
Individuals who are option buyers (companion behaviour study, ~5,000-trader sample)~97%; only the ~2% who sell had positive median returnsas reportedL1
Individuals' futures result, Q1 FY25 (Nifty +7%) · Q4 FY26 (Nifty −15%)+₹3,741 cr · −₹8,081 crSEBI studyL0
Individuals' options result, Q1 FY26 (Nifty +9%)−₹18,878 crSEBI studyL0

A same-day, out-of-the-money option is a ticket whose value decays to zero by the close; the seller on the other side is usually a hedged market maker keeping the decay and the spread. That is a description of the product, not a suggestion about which side to be on.

5 · Who the 88 lakh are

FigureValueSourceGrade
Under 3043% (31% in FY22); 89% of them loseSEBI studyL0
Declared income under ₹5 lakh (self-declared; data for ~55% of sample)~73–75%; 43% of turnover, 53% of lossesSEBI studyL0
From beyond the top-30 citiestwo-thirds of traders, half of turnover — while those cities hold a quarter of mutual-fund assetsSEBI studyL0
Hold no shares at all35% (42.8 lakh people)SEBI studyL0
Hold under ₹1 lakh in shares78%; produced 70% of lossesSEBI studyL0
Under ₹1 lakh portfolio but over ₹1 crore turnover13% of traders; 52% of all lossesSEBI studyL0
Turnover as a multiple of portfolio value42.5× overallSEBI studyL0
Loss rate, regular traders vs new traders87.7% vs 87.8% — regulars lose 2.3× more per head (₹1.36 lakh vs ₹59k) at 46× leverageSEBI studyL0
Two-year losers who lost again in year three90%SEBI studyL0
Women17% of traders; loss rate 84.7% vs 88.6%; same intensitySEBI studyL0

6 · Who bears the damage

The average loss of ₹1.17 lakh hides the shape. 77% of traders lose up to ₹1 lakh and account for about 10% of losses. 2.7% of traders — 1.88 lakh people — lost over ₹10 lakh each and account for 49% of losses. 4,783 individuals lost over ₹1 crore in FY26. Over two years, 13,663 people lost more than ₹1 crore (average ₹2.2 crore) against 1,842 who made more than ₹1 crore — seven to one; in the ₹1–10 lakh band it is twenty-one to one. Even the twenty highest-turnover individuals in the country were net losers. And the winners are shrinking: average profit per profit-maker halved between the two study periods, from ₹3.09 lakh to ₹1.46 lakh. L0

7 · By state — the map exists

The study's annexure gives the picture state by state (Table 45). The loss rate is above 85% everywhere. Where it is highest — Assam, Bihar, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh — is also where trading turnover is the largest multiple of what people actually own.

StateTurnover ÷ portfolio valueLoss rateGrade
Andhra Pradesh101×>85%L0
Odisha100×>85%L0
North-East (combined)93×>85%; Assam 90.5%, the highestL0
Bihar92×among the five highestL0
Jammu & Kashmir83×among the five highestL0
Maharashtra—15 lakh traders; ₹17,036 cr lostL0
All India42.5×87.7%L0

Full state table to follow once Table 45 is transcribed row by row — it becomes the second column of the Commons Atlas beside the CSR map.

The same shape as the CSR map

Our first series showed where India's corporate social spending goes: ₹61 a year reaches each poor person in Bihar, ₹64,308 in Goa. The money follows factories, not need. This series shows the mirror image: where household money leaves, and the states where it leaves fastest relative to what people own are the same states the CSR money never reaches. Two flows, one pattern: attention and capital priced against where need is.

Where the money doesn't arrive

CSR to Bihar: 0.95% of attributable spend for 20.5% of India's poor. Seven states hold 61% of the poor and receive 10.7% of the money. The Misallocation Index →

Where the money leaves

Bihar: trading turnover 92 times what traders own; loss rate among the five highest in the country. Nationally, ₹72,243 crore gross from 88 lakh accounts in one year, 98% of the winning side's profit from options. Sources ↓

8 · The ecosystem that runs on the flow

WhoFigureSourceGrade
The stock exchange (NSE)FY26 revenue ₹16,601 cr, profit ₹10,302 cr; equity options ₹9,997.5 cr = 60.2% of revenue; transaction charges 78.6%. Its public offering opened 17 Sept 2026: ₹22,561 cr raise at ~₹4.42 lakh cr valuation.NSE filings via UpstoxL1
The largest retail broker (Zerodha)FY26 profit ₹4,283 cr on ~₹8,500 cr revenue; brokerage falling, margin-funding income risingEntrackrL2
The state (securities transaction tax)₹53,296 cr (FY25) → ₹57,522 cr (FY26) → ₹73,700 cr budgeted FY27, after a second rate rise from 1 April 2026 (options premium 0.1 → 0.15%; futures 0.02 → 0.05%); ₹40,214 cr collected by 17 Sept, +53%. Individuals' STT in derivatives up five-fold since FY22.Business Standard; Budget documentsL1
Everyday expiryAn exchange product decision (NSE–BSE competition, 2019–24), not something traders inventedSEBI study; exchange circularsL1

The fiscal line grows while the regulator tries to shrink the base. We record that as a tension in the public record, not as a verdict on anyone's intent.

9 · When the rules were enforced

Two cases mark where the regulator drew the line — one a large foreign-owned firm trading through local entities, one a domestic social-media network. Both matter here: the first shows the other side of the ledger in the open; the second is what "organising retail" against institutions runs into.

CaseWhat the record saysGrade
SEBI v. Jane Street (interim order, 3 July 2025)Net India profit ₹36,502 cr, Jan 2023 – Mar 2025: about ₹43,300 cr won in index options against ~₹7,700 cr deliberately lost in stock futures, index futures and cash. Eighteen expiry days examined. On 17 Jan 2024: buy ~₹4,400–5,300 cr of Bank Nifty stocks and futures in the morning while holding ~₹32,000 cr of bearish options exposure (6:1), sell in the afternoon; ~₹735 cr profit that day. ₹4,843.57 cr impounded; ban lifted on deposit; Securities Appellate Tribunal appeal pending (adjourned 25 Feb 2026).L0
Where the profit was bookedProfits reported in the Singapore/Asia entities; cash-market losses in the Indian company (FPIs cannot trade intraday cash). Tax treatment as reported, not adjudicated.L2
JSI Investments (Jane Street's Indian entity), own filingNet trading gains ₹4,700 cr in FY25, up from ₹790 cr — +494%L1
SEBI finfluencer order, 23 May 2026Telegram / WhatsApp / X network (~54,000 followers) pushing 82 mostly small-cap stocks; ₹20.25 cr wrongful gains; restrained under fraud and unfair-trade-practice rulesL1
Millennium ManagementReported to be under SEBI examination nextL2

The line between "liquidity provision" and "manipulation" in the first case is one of degree: options exposure six times the cash being moved.

10 · What the November 2024 measures did

SEBI's own reading: the measures "moderated participation but did not fundamentally alter trading behaviour." The numbers behind that sentence:

FigureValueGrade
Individual traders−18% (106 → 87.5 lakh); new entrants −40%; 46 lakh people exitedL0
Smallest traders (<₹10k turnover) vs largest (>₹1 cr)−37% vs +1–3%L0
Premium turnover−17%, then +38% in H2 FY26 to ₹82,000 cr a day — above pre-measure levelsL0
Expiry-day share of index-option turnover70% → 59%L0
Loss per headup 2%L0
Global exchange-traded derivatives volume, 2025−42%, attributed to India's curbs aloneL1 (FIA)
Queued: suitability rules tied to equity holdings (Dec 2025 proposal) · expiry days cut to two a week (Sept 2025) · delta-based position limits · the April 2026 STT rise—L1
Precedent: Korea, 2011 — KOSPI 200 option multiplier raised five-fold; retail options volume collapsed. India chose lot-size and expiry limits and saw a rebound.—L1

11 · The household balance sheet, and where the savings go

Two numbers are often quoted about households, and both are usually quoted wrong. Savings did not "collapse to 5%" — that figure is net financial savings in FY23; net financial savings were 7.0% of national disposable income in FY25. Debt is higher than the commonly cited 41%: the Reserve Bank puts it at 45.5% of GDP (Sept 2025), with more than half of household borrowing now for consumption rather than housing. And the same households are, in aggregate, the most disciplined savers the market has ever had: SIP inflows hit a record ₹32,297 crore in August 2026; domestic institutions now own more of listed India than foreign ones. Both columns are true at once.

FigureValuePeriodSourceGrade
Household debt, share of GDP45.5% (5-yr avg 42.9%)Sept 2025RBI Financial Stability Report, June 2026L1
Non-housing retail loans, share of household borrowing58.4%Sept 2025RBI FSR, June 2026L1
Net household financial savings, share of GNDI7.0% (5.8% FY24)FY25RBI Annual Report, May 2026L1
The often-quoted "5.1%"net financial savings, FY23 — staleFY23widely repeatedL3
Monthly SIP inflow₹32,297 cr (record)Aug 2026AMFIL1
Ownership of NSE-listed companies: domestic institutions · FPIs · mutual funds · individuals19.5% · 15.1% (17-yr low) · 11.6% · 19.3% (₹90.3 lakh cr)Q2 FY26Business StandardL2
GDP growth7.8%Q1 FY27MoSPIL1
"₹17–19 lakh crore corporate cash, March 2026"extrapolation, no source found (verifiable: ₹14.3 lakh cr, Nifty 500, Sept 2024)——L3

12 · How to read the grades

GradeMeaning
L0We read the primary document ourselves (the SEBI study, the SEBI order) and the figure is quoted from it directly.
L1An official figure reported by a named outlet from the primary document, or our own arithmetic on a primary figure; we have not yet read that primary page ourselves. We upgrade to L0 as we do.
L2A press or industry compilation with a named source but no single official document behind it, or a matter reported but not adjudicated.
L3A widely repeated claim we could not source, or found to be stale or wrong. Kept on the ledger so the correction travels with the number.

All figures verified 23 September 2026. Nothing on this page is scored, ranked or combined into an index. Still to do: transcribe Table 45 in full; read the RBI FSR and Annual Report pages directly and upgrade §11.

Sources


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