Markets series · September 2026 · built from SEBI's own FY25–FY26 study
The Options Ledger — where ₹91,685 crore went
Every rupee lost in a derivatives trade is a rupee someone else made. India's market regulator has now published the ledger for two years running. This report reads it slowly: how much, from whom, to whom, and who collects a fee on the way.
Source for every figure unless marked otherwise: SEBI, Profitability of Individual Traders in the Equity Derivatives Segment (FY25–FY26), Department of Economic and Policy Analysis, 20 August 2026 — the PDF. "Individual traders" means people living in India, Hindu Undivided Families (HUFs), Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), sole traders, and clients of Portfolio Management Services (PMS). This report is not investment advice. It is a reading of a public document.
Data snapshot
- Two years, ₹2.03 lakh crore. 1.226 crore different people traded equity derivatives in FY25–FY26. 91.0% of them, or 111.6 lakh people, ended with a net loss. The two-year loss exceeds the ₹1.81 lakh crore lost in the three years before it (FY22–FY24).
- Options is the whole story. 99.3% of individuals traded options; 93% traded only options; 6.6% touched futures. Options produced 91.6% of losses. Over the two years the loss rate in options was 91.0% against 68.4% in futures.
- The winners are few. Proprietary desks, which are firms trading their own money, earned ₹44,483 crore before costs in FY26. The top ten of them took ₹33,124 crore, or three-quarters of the total. Foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) earned ₹13,896 crore, and their top ten took half.
- Costs on top. Individuals paid about ₹24,859 crore in brokers' fees, exchange fees and taxes in FY26. That is roughly ₹1 lakh crore over five years. 4.4 lakh people made a profit before costs, but ended the year with a loss after costs.
- Who trades. 43% are under 30. About three-quarters say they earn less than ₹5 lakh a year. Two-thirds live outside the 30 biggest cities. 35% own no shares at all, and 78% own shares worth less than ₹1 lakh.
- The measures. After SEBI's new limits in November 2024, the number of traders fell 18%, from 106 to 87.5 lakh. New traders fell 40%. But daily trading in options came back to ₹82,000 crore, higher than before the limits. And the average loss per trader rose 2%.
1. The ledger — before costs, gross, whole population
Before costs, derivatives are zero-sum. SEBI says so in the study's own words: "the aggregate losses of individual traders were broadly matched by the aggregate profits of corporate and institutional participants." This is the exchange data for every trader. It shows profit and loss before costs on closed trades, for FY25 and FY26.
| Category | FY25 (₹ cr) | FY26 (₹ cr) | Where FY26 profit came from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Individuals (106 → 88 lakh people) | −97,882 | −72,243 | >90% of the loss in options |
| Proprietary desks* | +45,955 | +44,483 | 98% from options |
| Foreign portfolio investors | +31,085 | +13,896 | 77% from options |
| Corporates and trusts | +8,092 | +5,960 | — |
| Partnership firms / LLPs | +4,737 | +2,953 | — |
| Mutual funds | +5,613 | +2,595 | — |
| Other domestic institutions | +101 | +225 | — |
*SEBI's note on the category: proprietary traders "also includes global participants who operate in the capacity of Trading Member – Proprietary in India and are owned by foreign entities." So the split is not Indian against foreign. It is local prop desks against FPI accounts. Two-year totals for FY25–FY26: individuals −₹1.70 lakh crore · prop desks +₹90,437 cr · FPIs +₹44,980 cr · companies +₹14,242 cr · mutual funds +₹8,208 cr · LLPs +₹7,690 cr.
2. Who wins — twenty desks, one algorithm each
Proprietary desks make about 60% of all derivatives trades, and FPIs about 7%. Inside the prop group, the trading and the profit sit with a handful of firms.
| Rank by turnover | Share of prop index-options turnover | Share of prop gross profit (₹44,483 cr) | Share of FPI gross profit (₹13,896 cr) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Top 5 | 62% | 47.6% (₹21,157 cr) | 27.8% (₹3,866 cr) |
| Top 10 | 85% | 74.5% (₹33,124 cr) | 49.3% (₹6,852 cr) |
| Top 20 | 90% | 82.4% (₹36,656 cr) | 54.2% (₹7,526 cr) |
- 99% of FPI and prop profit came from entities that placed at least one algorithmic order in the year. 86% of FPIs and 47% of prop desks trade algorithmically. Among individuals the "15% algo" figure mostly counts brokers' 3:20 pm automatic square-offs, not the client's own strategy.
- The ten largest prop desks are 2.3% of the category. Their ₹33,124 crore is about a third of the ₹1.04 lakh crore that all 69 lakh loss-makers lost between them.
- Even the twenty highest-turnover individuals in the country were net losers as a group (−₹77 crore).
- FPIs hold a quarter to a third of open interest on 7% of turnover: they hedge and hold. The high-frequency layer is the prop layer — some of it foreign-owned and registered locally.
"Options liquidity is therefore closely tied to the continued participation of these few large firms in the market." — SEBI, §6.19
3. Why options lose in every quarter
SEBI splits futures from options, quarter by quarter. In futures, individuals mostly bet that prices will rise, so their results follow the market. They made ₹3,741 crore in Q1 FY25, when the Nifty rose 7%. They lost ₹8,081 crore in Q4 FY26, when it fell 15%. In options, they lost money in every quarter of both years. That includes Q1 FY26, when the Nifty gained 9% and the options loss only shrank to ₹18,878 crore. Which way the market moves hardly matters, because what they are buying is time.
- The expiry-day lottery. 59% of index-option trading happens on the day the contract ends. Before the limits, it was 70%. 75% happens within one day of the end, and 97% within a week. Contracts with more than ten days left make up just 1% of trading.
- Buyers, not sellers. SEBI also studied how 5,000 traders behave. As reported, it found that about 97% of individuals buy options. The roughly 2% who sell options were the only group whose typical trader made money. Take an option that ends the same day, at a price the market has not reached. It is a ticket bought from a market maker who has covered their risk. The market maker keeps what the ticket loses over time, plus the gap between buying and selling prices.
- Costs finish the job. For loss-makers, transaction costs were 35% of gross losses in FY26 (44% in FY25). 5.3 lakh gross-profitable traders in FY25 and 4.4 lakh in FY26 ended net negative purely because of costs.
- Experience does not help. 87.69% of regular traders lost, against 87.81% of first-timers. Regulars simply lost 2.3× more per head (₹1.36 lakh vs ₹59k) while trading at 46× their portfolio value. 90% of people who lost two years running lost again in the third.
4. Who the 88 lakh are
- Young. 43% are under 30 (31% in FY22). 89% of them lose, against 81% of traders over 60.
- Low declared income. About 73–75% say they earn less than ₹5 lakh a year. Income is self-declared, and the study has it for 55% of the sample. This group makes 43% of trades but takes 53% of losses. 88% of them lose, against 71% of people earning ₹50 lakh–₹1 crore.
- Beyond the metros. Two-thirds of traders, and half of all trading, come from outside the 30 biggest cities. Those places hold only a quarter of India's mutual-fund savings.
- No cushion. 42.8 lakh traders (35%) hold no equity at all. 95 lakh (78%) hold under ₹1 lakh, and this group produced 70% of losses. The 13% who hold under ₹1 lakh yet turn over more than ₹1 crore a year produced 52% of all losses.
- Leverage on nothing. Across India, people trade 42.5 times what they own in shares. It is 101 times in Andhra Pradesh, 100 times in Odisha, 93 times in the North-East, 92 times in Bihar and 83 times in Jammu & Kashmir.
- Everywhere. More than 85% of traders lose in every state. Highest loss rates: Assam 90.5%, Bihar 89.5%, J&K 89.5%, Jharkhand 89.4%, Chhattisgarh 89.1%. Maharashtra alone: 14.95 lakh traders, ₹17,036 crore lost. Highest loss per person: Telangana (₹1.83 lakh), Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi.
- Women are 17% of traders, up from 13.7% in FY24. They lose slightly less often, 84.7% against 88.6%, and they trade just as much.
5. Who bears it — the shape behind the average
The ₹1.17 lakh average loss hides a steep shape. Most people lose a little; a small group loses a great deal.
| Loss in FY26 | People | Share of loss-makers | Share of all losses |
|---|---|---|---|
| More than ₹10 lakh | 1,88,189 | 2.7% | 49.1% |
| ₹1 lakh – ₹10 lakh | 13,91,710 | 20.2% | 40.8% |
| ₹10,000 – ₹1 lakh | 25,09,302 | 36.4% | 9.3% |
| Up to ₹10,000 | 28,05,807 | 40.7% | 0.8% |
- 4,783 people lost more than ₹1 crore each in FY26. Over the two years, 13,663 people lost over ₹1 crore, ₹2.2 crore on average. Only 1,842 made over ₹1 crore. That is seven losers for every winner. Between ₹1 lakh and ₹10 lakh, it is 21 to 1.
- The winners are winning less. The average profit of those who made money halved between the two studies, from ₹3.09 lakh (FY22–24) to ₹1.46 lakh (FY25–26). The average loss of those who lost stayed at about ₹1.97 lakh.
- In every slab, from ₹10,000 to ₹10 crore, loss-makers outnumber profit-makers.
6. The costs — and who collects them
Individuals paid about ₹24,859 crore in FY26 to trade derivatives. That is about the same as FY25, even though trading fell 5%. The tax went up while brokers' fees went down. SEBI notes that its cost figure covers about 80% of trading, so the true number is nearer ₹31,000 crore.
- The exchange. NSE's FY26 income was ₹16,601 crore, and its profit ₹10,302 crore. Equity options alone brought in ₹9,997.5 crore, or 60.2% of its income. NSE began selling its own shares to the public on 17 September 2026. It is raising ₹22,561 crore, at a value of about ₹4.42 lakh crore. Source.
- The brokers. Zerodha's FY26 profit was ₹4,283 crore, on roughly ₹8,500 crore of income. Its income from fees is falling, and income from lending to traders is taking its place. Source.
- The state. The government collected ₹53,296 crore in securities transaction tax (STT) in FY25, and ₹57,522 crore in FY26. It has budgeted ₹73,700 crore for FY27, after a second rate rise from 1 April 2026. The rate on options went from 0.1% to 0.15%, and on futures from 0.02% to 0.05%. By 17 September 2026, ₹40,214 crore had been collected, up 53%. Source. STT paid by individuals in derivatives rose five-fold between FY22 and FY26.
- The product. By FY24, some weekly contract was ending on almost every trading day. This "everyday expiry" was a product choice the two exchanges made while competing with each other. Traders did not invent it. The lottery was built, then taxed.
7. The other side, in the open — Jane Street
The winning side is usually invisible. One case made it public. SEBI's interim order of 3 July 2025 found that the Jane Street group made a net profit of about ₹36,502 crore in India, between January 2023 and March 2025. It won about ₹43,300 crore in index options. Against that, it knowingly lost roughly ₹7,700 crore in stock futures, index futures and cash. SEBI looked at eighteen days when contracts ended, and found a pattern. In the morning, the group bought Bank Nifty stocks and futures hard. At the same time, it held options bets several times larger that prices would fall. In the afternoon, it sold, as the contracts settled. On 17 January 2024, that meant roughly ₹4,400–5,300 crore of stocks and futures, against about ₹32,000 crore of options bets. That is six to one, and it made about ₹735 crore of profit in one day.
- The profits were recorded in the group's Singapore and Asia companies. The cash-market losses sat in the Indian company, because foreign portfolio investors cannot buy and sell shares within one day. This tax picture is as reported. No court or regulator has ruled on it.
- SEBI seized ₹4,843.57 crore. The trading ban was lifted once that amount was deposited. Jane Street's appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal was still waiting for a decision in February 2026. Source.
- The Indian company's own filing shows net trading gains of ₹4,700 crore in FY25. That is up from ₹790 crore the year before, a rise of 494%. Source.
- The regulator has not named the other nineteen desks in its top-twenty table. It does not have to; the study says liquidity depends on them.
Background: Oxford Business Law Blog · Capitalmind.
8. What the November 2024 measures did — and did not
- Each exchange may now offer weekly contracts on only one index. The smallest trade size was raised. Option prices must be paid up front. On the day contracts end, a margin discount was removed, and selling options needs extra margin. Separately, STT was raised on 1 October 2024, and again on 1 April 2026. From September 2025, contracts end on only two days a week.
- Participation fell: Traders fell from 106.2 to 87.5 lakh, down 18%. It was the first fall since FY16. New traders fell 40%, from 34.3 to 20.8 lakh. 46 lakh people who traded in FY25 did not trade in FY26.
- The smallest left; the largest stayed: traders who trade less than ₹10,000 a year fell 37%. Those who trade more than ₹1 crore grew 1–3%.
- Turnover came back: daily options trading fell 17% after the limits. Then it rose 38% in the second half of FY26, to about ₹82,000 crore. That is higher than before the limits. The share of trading on the day contracts end fell from 70% to 59%.
- Per-head loss rose 2%. SEBI's own conclusion: the measures "moderated participation but did not fundamentally alter trading behaviour."
- Scale, for perspective: India's limits were the main reason that derivatives trading on the world's exchanges fell 42% in 2025. That shows how big a share of the world's options the Indian small-trader lottery had become. FIA.
The pattern is not Indian. SEBI's own table of past studies shows this. In Brazil, 97% of people who day-traded index futures for more than 300 days lost money. In Europe, 74–89% of accounts trading contracts for difference (CFDs) lose. It is ~82% in the UK and ~68% in Australia. In the US, about two in three small forex accounts lose each quarter. Short-term bets with borrowed money lose everywhere. What is Indian is the size, the youth and the income profile of the crowd.
9. Three live levers
- SEBI's suitability consultation. Since December 2025, the regulator has been studying whether only people who own enough shares should be allowed to trade derivatives. A paper asking for public comments is expected. When it opens, comments from ordinary families, not only brokers, will decide what "suitability" comes to mean. Source.
- The NSE prospectus. An exchange whose revenue is 60% equity options is now a public company. Its risk factors on regulatory dependence are a public document; reading them is a citizen's act.
- The STT line in the Budget. One question for a Member of Parliament: why does the Union Budget forecast growth in a tax whose base the regulator is trying to shrink?
How to check us
- Primary source: SEBI study PDF, 91 pages (landing page). Sections 4–5 hold the category ledger and concentration tables; 6–9 the individual analysis; the executive summary carries every headline figure used here.
- Method notes to keep in mind: category P&L (§1–2) is gross, whole-population, from the exchanges; individual figures (§3–8) are net of costs, from a sample of the top 15 brokers covering about 90% of individuals. Income is self-declared and available for 55% of the sample. FY25 figures were revised when the broker sample grew from 13 to 15.
- Secondary sources are linked inline: Business Standard (STT, demographics), Upstox (NSE FY26 and IPO), Entrackr (Zerodha), FIA (global volumes), Business Today (Jane Street appeal), Yahoo Finance (JSI filing), Oxford Business Law Blog and Capitalmind (the mechanics), Angel One (suitability).
- Earlier SEBI studies for the arc: September 2024 (FY22–FY24: 93%, ₹1.8 lakh crore); January 2023 (FY22: 89%).
- Everything here is CC-BY-SA 4.0. Take the numbers, re-run the reading on your own state — the state annexure is Table 45 of the PDF.
One-line synthesis
India's derivatives market has solved liquidity: there is always someone to trade with. That someone is about twenty computer-run trading desks. Every day that contracts end, they are paid by 88 lakh people, most of them young and earning little, who are betting on borrowed time. The exchange, the broker and the government each take a fee along the way. So far, the only thing that has cut the bill is fewer people showing up.