The Household Ledger — what the market promised, what it took
India's economy grew 7.8% last quarter. Savings are flowing into the market at a record pace. In the same year, 88 lakh ordinary people traded derivatives, which are bets on where prices will go. Taken together, they lost ₹72,243 crore to the other side of the market. They lost about ₹25,000 crore more in costs. Almost all of it was in options, and almost all of it went to about twenty firms that trade by computer. This page sets out the public record side by side, figure by figure, with where each one came from. It does not tell you what to do with your money.
What this page will not do
It will not recommend an investment, a mix of investments, an exit, a "hedge", or a side of any trade. It will not score anyone. Leap of Faith Labs is not a registered investment adviser, and does not want to be one. This is a ledger. It is the public record, read from the original documents. Every figure has a grade for how directly we checked it. If a number here changes your mind, the source is beside it so you can check us.
1 · The ledger, before costs
Before costs, derivatives are zero-sum. Every rupee one side loses, the other side gains. SEBI's study says so in its own words: "the aggregate losses of individual traders were broadly matched by the aggregate profits of corporate and institutional participants." This table is exchange data for every trader. It shows profit and loss on closed trades, for FY25 and FY26.
| Category | FY25 | FY26 | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Individuals (106 lakh → 88 lakh people) | −₹97,882 cr | −₹72,243 cr | L0 |
| Proprietary desks (exchange members trading their own book; includes foreign-owned firms registered locally) | +₹45,955 cr | +₹44,483 cr | L0 |
| Foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) | +₹31,085 cr | +₹13,896 cr | L0 |
| Corporates and trusts | +₹8,092 cr | +₹5,960 cr | L0 |
| Mutual funds | +₹5,613 cr | +₹2,595 cr | L0 |
| Partnerships and LLPs | +₹4,737 cr | +₹2,953 cr | L0 |
FY26 gross, scaled to the individual loss. Source: SEBI study, 20 Aug 2026. L0
2 · Then the costs, paid by individuals
On top of the ₹72,243 crore that went to the other side, individuals paid ₹24,859 crore in costs in FY26. Brokers' fees were about 44% of that (~₹11,000 crore). Securities transaction tax was 27% (₹6,645 crore). Exchange fees were 16%, GST 11%, and stamp duty and SEBI's fee about 2%. The study's own footnote says its cost figure covers about 80% of trading. So the true cost is nearer 1.25 times that, roughly ₹31,000 crore. The study also used a sample of fifteen brokers, covering about 90% of individuals. After costs, their loss is the ₹91,685 crore that made the headlines. Over FY25 and FY26 together, individuals lost ₹2.03 lakh crore after costs. That is more than the ₹1.81 lakh crore lost in the three years before.
For those who lost, costs were 35% of their gross loss (44% in FY25). 4.4 lakh people were profitable before costs and net losers after them.
| Figure | Value | Source | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Costs paid by individuals, FY26 (study figure) | ₹24,859 cr | SEBI study, 20 Aug 2026 | L0 |
| Costs, adjusted for the study's ~80% coverage | ≈ ₹31,000 cr | our arithmetic on the study's footnote | L1 |
| Net loss after costs, FY26 (15-broker sample, ~90%) | ₹91,685 cr | SEBI study | L0 |
| Net loss, FY25 | ₹1.12 lakh cr | SEBI study | L0 |
| Net loss, FY25 + FY26 | ₹2.03 lakh cr | SEBI study | L0 |
| Net loss, FY22–FY24 (three years, earlier study) | ₹1.81 lakh cr | SEBI study | L0 |
| Costs as share of loss-makers' gross loss | 35% (44% in FY25) | SEBI study | L0 |
| Profitable before costs, losers after | 4.4 lakh people | SEBI study | L0 |
3 · How concentrated the winning side is
People often say it is "foreign investors against Indians". The study's data does not support that. Proprietary desks, which are exchange members trading their own money, make about 60% of all trades. Foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) make about 7%. And the proprietary group includes foreign-owned firms that trade as Indian members. Jane Street's Indian company is one. The honest split is local proprietary desks against foreign portfolio accounts. Most of the money goes to the local desks. Inside the proprietary group, the money is more concentrated than the headlines show:
| Figure | Value | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| Top 10 proprietary desks, share of proprietary index-option turnover | 85% (top 20: 90%) | L0 |
| Top 10 proprietary desks (2.3% of the category), profit | ₹33,124 cr — 74.5% of all proprietary profit | L0 |
| Top 5 proprietary desks, profit | ₹21,157 cr | L0 |
| Top 10 FPIs, profit | ₹6,852 cr — 49% of FPI profit | L0 |
| Share of FPI and proprietary profit from entities that placed at least one algorithmic order | 99% | L0 |
| Entities trading algorithmically | 86% of FPIs · 47% of proprietary desks | L0 |
| Individuals flagged "algorithmic" (mostly brokers' 3:20 pm auto-square-off, not the client's own algorithm) | ~15% | L0 |
| Share of profit from options | proprietary 98% · FPIs 77%; individuals lost >90% in options | L0 |
| FPI open interest vs turnover | a quarter to a third of open interest on 7% of turnover — position-holders, not the high-frequency side | L0 |
So roughly ₹40,000 crore of FY26's ₹58,000 crore institutional gain went to about twenty entities. The study states the dependency itself: "options liquidity is closely tied to the continued participation of these few large firms."
4 · Why options lose whichever way the market goes
The study separates futures from options by quarter. In futures, individuals mostly bet that prices will rise, so their results follow the market. They made ₹3,741 crore in Q1 FY25, when the Nifty rose 7%. They lost ₹8,081 crore in Q4 FY26, when it fell 15%. In options, individuals lost money every single quarter. That includes Q1 FY26, when the Nifty rose 9% and they still lost ₹18,878 crore. Which way the market moves hardly matters, because what is really being traded is time:
| Figure | Value | Source | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Index-option turnover on the expiry day itself | 59% (70% before Nov 2024) | SEBI study | L0 |
| … within one day of expiry · within a week · more than ten days out | 75% · 97% · 1% | SEBI study | L0 |
| Individuals who are option buyers (companion behaviour study, ~5,000-trader sample) | ~97%; only the ~2% who sell had positive median returns | as reported | L1 |
| Individuals' futures result, Q1 FY25 (Nifty +7%) · Q4 FY26 (Nifty −15%) | +₹3,741 cr · −₹8,081 cr | SEBI study | L0 |
| Individuals' options result, Q1 FY26 (Nifty +9%) | −₹18,878 cr | SEBI study | L0 |
Take an option that ends the same day, at a price the market has not reached. It is a ticket whose value shrinks to zero by closing time. The seller on the other side is usually a market maker who has covered their risk. They keep what the ticket loses, plus the gap between buying and selling prices. That is a description of the product, not a suggestion about which side to be on.
5 · Who the 88 lakh are
| Figure | Value | Source | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Under 30 | 43% (31% in FY22); 89% of them lose | SEBI study | L0 |
| Declared income under ₹5 lakh (self-declared; data for ~55% of sample) | ~73–75%; 43% of turnover, 53% of losses | SEBI study | L0 |
| From beyond the top-30 cities | two-thirds of traders, half of turnover — while those cities hold a quarter of mutual-fund assets | SEBI study | L0 |
| Hold no shares at all | 35% (42.8 lakh people) | SEBI study | L0 |
| Hold under ₹1 lakh in shares | 78%; produced 70% of losses | SEBI study | L0 |
| Under ₹1 lakh portfolio but over ₹1 crore turnover | 13% of traders; 52% of all losses | SEBI study | L0 |
| Turnover as a multiple of portfolio value | 42.5× overall | SEBI study | L0 |
| Loss rate, regular traders vs new traders | 87.7% vs 87.8% — regulars lose 2.3× more per head (₹1.36 lakh vs ₹59k) at 46× leverage | SEBI study | L0 |
| Two-year losers who lost again in year three | 90% | SEBI study | L0 |
| Women | 17% of traders; loss rate 84.7% vs 88.6%; same intensity | SEBI study | L0 |
6 · Who bears the damage
The average loss of ₹1.17 lakh hides the shape. 77% of traders lose up to ₹1 lakh each, and together they make up about 10% of losses. 2.7% of traders, or 1.88 lakh people, lost over ₹10 lakh each. Together they make up 49% of losses. 4,783 individuals lost over ₹1 crore in FY26. Over two years, 13,663 people lost more than ₹1 crore, ₹2.2 crore on average. Only 1,842 made more than ₹1 crore. That is seven losers for every winner. Between ₹1 lakh and ₹10 lakh, it is twenty-one to one. Even the twenty highest-turnover individuals in the country were net losers. And the winners are shrinking: average profit per profit-maker halved between the two study periods, from ₹3.09 lakh to ₹1.46 lakh. L0
7 · By state — the map exists
Table 45 in the study's annexe gives the picture state by state. More than 85% of traders lose money in every state. The loss rate is highest in Assam, Bihar, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. Those are also the states where people trade the most, compared with what they actually own.
| State | Turnover ÷ portfolio value | Loss rate | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| Andhra Pradesh | 101× | >85% | L0 |
| Odisha | 100× | >85% | L0 |
| North-East (combined) | 93× | >85%; Assam 90.5%, the highest | L0 |
| Bihar | 92× | among the five highest | L0 |
| Jammu & Kashmir | 83× | among the five highest | L0 |
| Maharashtra | — | 15 lakh traders; ₹17,036 cr lost | L0 |
| All India | 42.5× | 87.7% | L0 |
The full state table will follow once we copy Table 45 row by row. It will sit in the Commons Atlas, beside the CSR map.
The same shape as the CSR map
Our first series showed where India's CSR money goes. Each poor person in Bihar gets ₹61 a year, and each one in Goa gets ₹64,308. The money follows factories, not need. This series shows the mirror image: where family money leaves. The states where it leaves fastest, compared with what people own, are the same states that CSR money never reaches. Two flows, one pattern. Attention and money both move away from where the need is.
Where the money doesn't arrive
CSR to Bihar: 0.95% of attributable spend for 20.5% of India's poor. Seven states hold 61% of the poor and receive 10.7% of the money. The Misallocation Index →
Where the money leaves
Bihar: trading turnover 92 times what traders own; loss rate among the five highest in the country. Nationally, ₹72,243 crore gross from 88 lakh accounts in one year, 98% of the winning side's profit from options. Sources ↓
8 · The ecosystem that runs on the flow
| Who | Figure | Source | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| The stock exchange (NSE) | FY26 revenue ₹16,601 cr, profit ₹10,302 cr; equity options ₹9,997.5 cr = 60.2% of revenue; transaction charges 78.6%. Its public offering opened 17 Sept 2026: ₹22,561 cr raise at ~₹4.42 lakh cr valuation. | NSE filings via Upstox | L1 |
| The largest retail broker (Zerodha) | FY26 profit ₹4,283 cr on ~₹8,500 cr revenue; brokerage falling, margin-funding income rising | Entrackr | L2 |
| The state (securities transaction tax) | ₹53,296 cr (FY25) → ₹57,522 cr (FY26) → ₹73,700 cr budgeted FY27, after a second rate rise from 1 April 2026 (options premium 0.1 → 0.15%; futures 0.02 → 0.05%); ₹40,214 cr collected by 17 Sept, +53%. Individuals' STT in derivatives up five-fold since FY22. | Business Standard; Budget documents | L1 |
| Everyday expiry | An exchange product decision (NSE–BSE competition, 2019–24), not something traders invented | SEBI study; exchange circulars | L1 |
The fiscal line grows while the regulator tries to shrink the base. We record that as a tension in the public record, not as a verdict on anyone's intent.
9 · When the rules were enforced
Two cases show where the regulator drew the line. One is a large foreign-owned firm trading through local companies. The other is an Indian social-media network. Both matter here. The first shows the other side of the ledger in the open. The second shows what happens when someone tries to "organise" small traders against the big firms.
| Case | What the record says | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| SEBI v. Jane Street (interim order, 3 July 2025) | Net India profit ₹36,502 cr, Jan 2023 – Mar 2025: about ₹43,300 cr won in index options against ~₹7,700 cr deliberately lost in stock futures, index futures and cash. Eighteen expiry days examined. On 17 Jan 2024: buy ~₹4,400–5,300 cr of Bank Nifty stocks and futures in the morning while holding ~₹32,000 cr of bearish options exposure (6:1), sell in the afternoon; ~₹735 cr profit that day. ₹4,843.57 cr impounded; ban lifted on deposit; Securities Appellate Tribunal appeal pending (adjourned 25 Feb 2026). | L0 |
| Where the profit was booked | Profits reported in the Singapore/Asia entities; cash-market losses in the Indian company (FPIs cannot trade intraday cash). Tax treatment as reported, not adjudicated. | L2 |
| JSI Investments (Jane Street's Indian entity), own filing | Net trading gains ₹4,700 cr in FY25, up from ₹790 cr — +494% | L1 |
| SEBI finfluencer order, 23 May 2026 | Telegram / WhatsApp / X network (~54,000 followers) pushing 82 mostly small-cap stocks; ₹20.25 cr wrongful gains; restrained under fraud and unfair-trade-practice rules | L1 |
| Millennium Management | Reported to be under SEBI examination next | L2 |
In the first case, the line between "making the market work" and "manipulation" is a matter of degree. The firm's options bets were six times the size of the cash it moved.
10 · What the November 2024 measures did
SEBI's own reading: the measures "moderated participation but did not fundamentally alter trading behaviour." The numbers behind that sentence:
| Figure | Value | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| Individual traders | −18% (106 → 87.5 lakh); new entrants −40%; 46 lakh people exited | L0 |
| Smallest traders (<₹10k turnover) vs largest (>₹1 cr) | −37% vs +1–3% | L0 |
| Premium turnover | −17%, then +38% in H2 FY26 to ₹82,000 cr a day — above pre-measure levels | L0 |
| Expiry-day share of index-option turnover | 70% → 59% | L0 |
| Loss per head | up 2% | L0 |
| Global exchange-traded derivatives volume, 2025 | −42%, attributed to India's curbs alone | L1 (FIA) |
| Queued: suitability rules tied to equity holdings (Dec 2025 proposal) · expiry days cut to two a week (Sept 2025) · delta-based position limits · the April 2026 STT rise | — | L1 |
| Precedent: Korea, 2011 — KOSPI 200 option multiplier raised five-fold; retail options volume collapsed. India chose lot-size and expiry limits and saw a rebound. | — | L1 |
11 · The household balance sheet, and where the savings go
People often quote two numbers about families, and both are usually wrong. Savings did not "collapse to 5%". That figure is net financial savings in FY23. In FY25, net financial savings were 7.0% of national disposable income. Debt is higher than the 41% people often quote. The Reserve Bank puts it at 45.5% of GDP (Sept 2025). More than half of what families borrow is now for spending, not housing. Yet taken together, the same families are the most steady savers the market has ever had. Monthly SIP savings hit a record ₹32,297 crore in August 2026. Indian institutions now own more of India's listed companies than foreign ones do. Both columns are true at once.
| Figure | Value | Period | Source | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Household debt, share of GDP | 45.5% (5-yr avg 42.9%) | Sept 2025 | RBI Financial Stability Report, June 2026 | L1 |
| Non-housing retail loans, share of household borrowing | 58.4% | Sept 2025 | RBI FSR, June 2026 | L1 |
| Net household financial savings, share of GNDI | 7.0% (5.8% FY24) | FY25 | RBI Annual Report, May 2026 | L1 |
| The often-quoted "5.1%" | net financial savings, FY23 — stale | FY23 | widely repeated | L3 |
| Monthly SIP inflow | ₹32,297 cr (record) | Aug 2026 | AMFI | L1 |
| Ownership of NSE-listed companies: domestic institutions · FPIs · mutual funds · individuals | 19.5% · 15.1% (17-yr low) · 11.6% · 19.3% (₹90.3 lakh cr) | Q2 FY26 | Business Standard | L2 |
| GDP growth | 7.8% | Q1 FY27 | MoSPI | L1 |
| "₹17–19 lakh crore corporate cash, March 2026" | extrapolation, no source found (verifiable: ₹14.3 lakh cr, Nifty 500, Sept 2024) | — | — | L3 |
12 · How to read the grades
| Grade | Meaning |
|---|---|
| L0 | We read the primary document ourselves (the SEBI study, the SEBI order) and the figure is quoted from it directly. |
| L1 | An official figure that a named news outlet reported from the original document. Or our own sum using an original figure. We have not yet read that original page ourselves. When we do, we raise it to L0. |
| L2 | A list put together by the press or by industry, with a named source but no single official document behind it. Or a case that was reported but not yet decided by a court or regulator. |
| L3 | A widely repeated claim we could not source, or found to be stale or wrong. Kept on the ledger so the correction travels with the number. |
All figures verified 23 September 2026. Nothing on this page is scored, ranked or combined into an index. Still to do: transcribe Table 45 in full; read the RBI FSR and Annual Report pages directly and upgrade §11.
Sources
- SEBI, Study: Profitability of Individual Traders in the Equity Derivatives Segment, FY25–FY26, 20 Aug 2026 — PDF (91 pages) · study page
- Demographics as reported — Business Standard, 23 Aug 2026 · CorpLawUpdates summary
- Securities transaction tax — Business Standard, 18 Sept 2026
- NSE revenue and offering — Upstox, Sept 2026
- Zerodha FY26 — Entrackr
- Global derivatives volume 2025 — FIA
- Jane Street — SAT status, Feb 2026 · JSI Investments filing · Capitalmind on the mechanics · Oxford Business Law Blog
- Suitability rules — as reported · Millennium — BusinessWorld
- SEBI finfluencer order, 23 May 2026 — ANI
- RBI Financial Stability Report, June 2026 — household debt, Business Standard · RBI Annual Report, May 2026 — savings, Business Standard
- AMFI, Aug 2026 — SIP ₹32,297 cr · Ownership — Business Standard · GDP — Business Standard
- CSR figures — The CSR Misallocation Index · How we make these reports
Leap of Faith Labs · CC-BY-SA 4.0 · Take this ledger, check it, extend it. If you find a figure wrong, tell us — the correction goes on the page with your name if you want it there.